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CORPORATION V. SUPERIOR COURT
[44 C.2d 559; 283 P.2d '100]

[L. A. No. 23536.

In Bank.

May 10, 1955.]

I.E.S. CORPORATION (a Corporation) et a!., Petitioners,
v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
et a!., Respondents; MAX GOLD et al., Real Partif-' in
Interest.
[1] Depositions-Examination-Scope of Inquiry.-In interest of
full disclosure, witness in deposition taken pursuant to Code
Civ. Proc., § 2021, subd. I, must answer all questions seeking
nonpriviIeged information that is: material to subject matter
of pending action, and he cannot block interrogation by contending that it is "fishing expedition" or by urging secrecy of
his methods of doing business.
[2] Id.-Examination.-Taking of deposition must not be abused,
and witness need not answer questions that serve no proper
purpose or are irrelevant. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2065, 2066.)
[3] Id. - Examination - Scope of Inquiry. - With reference to
issues raised in pending action involving contracts for purchase of war surplus engines and equipment from defendant,
questions asked defendant in pretrial deposition as to his
knowledge of engines and their market values and as to identity
of persons who sold goods to defendant or from whom he in·
tended to buy are material and must be answered, where dE'fendant's knowledge is relevant to question whether his representations were made without belief or in absence of reasonable
grounds for belief in their truth (eiv. Code, § 1710, subds. I,
2), where plaintiff is entitled to learn sources of goods to determine whether they were sold to defendant in condition and
at prices represented and whether sellers had conspired with
defendant to defraud plaintiff, and where identity of persons
from whom defendant intended to buy is relevant in that, if
his answers indicated that he had no anticipated source of
supply, such fact would tend to prove that he made promises
to plaintiff without intention to perform them. (Civ. Code,
§ 1710, subd. 4.)
[4] Witnesses-Privileged Oommunication-Attorney and Olient.Attorney-elient privilege (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 2)
cannot be defeated by attempting to elicit privileged communications from client instead of attorney.
[5] Depositions-Examination-Scope of Inquiry.-With reference to issues raised in pending action involving contracts

•

[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Depositions, § 50; Am.Jm., Depositions,
152 et seq.
MeR. Dig. References: [1-3,5] Depositions, § 19; [4] Witnessea,
174; [6] Mandamus, § 15(6).
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for purchase of war surplus engines from defendant, questions
asked defendant in pretrial deposition as to whether or not
he had conversation about buying stock in plaintiff company
had no bearing on invalidity of contracts, breaches of CODtracts, misrepresentations or conspiracies alleged in complaint,
• and questions seeking identities of everyone defendant knew
in surplus business and everyone he interviewed in Chicago
were too broad, and defendant properly refused to answer such
questions.
[6] Mandamus-Existence of Other Remedy.-'Where appeal from
final judgment would not afford adequate remedy for correcting order of court sustaining defendant's refusal to answer
questions on depositioD, mandamus is proper remedy.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel Superior Court ot
Los Angeles County and Arnold Praeger, Judge thereof, to
set aside order sustaining refusal by defendant, in pending
action, to answer certain questions in pretrial deposition and
to enter an order compelling defendant to answer such questions. Writ granted.
Combs & Hoose, Lee Combs and Harned Pettus Hoose tor
Petitioners.

)

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Wm. E.
Lameroux, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondents.
Leo K. Gold for Real Parties in Interest.
TRAYNOR, J .-Petitioners, plaintiffs in an action pending
in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seek a writ of
mandate directing respondent court to set aside an order
sustaining defendant's refusal to answer certain questions in
a pretrial deposition and to enter an order compelling defendant to answer these questions and any other similar
questions that may be asked.
The complaint in the pending action alleges that plaintiff·
entered into a series of contracts and options for the purchase
of war surplus engines, machmery, and equipment from
defendant in reliance on defendant's representations that he
possessed suffici~t funds and organizational capacity to perform, that the engines were new and serviceable, and that he
would obtain them for plaintiff at below market rates. It
·PlaintiJl's are two closely related corporations bearing the same name.
III both the 'pleadings and the briefs they are frequentl¥ refiued to ..
. . eorporatioD aDd wiD be 10 referred to hereiD.
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is charged that these representations were fraudulent, that
plaintiff's former president exceeded his authority in negotiating and signing the contpacts on plaintiff's behalf, and
that defendant breached the contract by failing to deliver 750
engines. It is also alleged that plaintiff and defendant red"aced the contracts and options to a single integrated option,
but when plaintiff attempted to acquire certain machinery by
exercising a separate and divisible part of the option, defendant refused to perform; that plaintiff issued a notice of
rescission as to all contracts and options except those pertaining to certain items of machinery that already had been
delivered and accepted; and that although defendant con-.
tinues to demand payments, plaintiff owes nothing to defendant but is itself entitled to damages because the accepted goods
were inferior in quality and higher in price than represented.
The complaint also contains extensive alJegations concerning a conspiracy by defendant, various sellers of war surplus
engines, and plaintiff's former president. It is alleged that
"the defendants and each and every one of them did conspire
and agree that they would purchase and give option for and
purport to sell to the plaintiff certain war surplus and other
machinery and equipment at extremely high and unfair prices;
that defendants and each of them did further conspire to defraud the plantiffs by misrepresenting to the plaintiffs the
true condition of said machinery and equipment, by obtaining
secret rebates and secret profits by reason of the plaintiffs'
purchase of said machinery and equipment, by the delivery
to the plaintiffs by the defendants and each of them of machinery and equipment of an inferior type which was represented to the plaintiffs as unused machinery or machinery
and in good condition (sic), and by doing and conspiring
to do each and every one of said acts."
The complaint
charges that pursuant'to the conspiracy, defendant and plaintiff's former president made an extensive buying trip together
during which they got in touch with sellers of war surplus
machinery and conspired with them to "lure the plaintiffs
into numerous purchases of non-existent machinery, inferior
machinery, highly overpriced machinery, machinery as to
which the defendants and each of them had no right to grant
options or to sell, . . . and to extract huge secret profits and
rebates from plaintiffs and to sell to plaintiffs inferidr and
unmerchandiseable machinery at a vast profit." Numerous
llctitious persons are joined as defendants, and it is alleged
that they are the unknown conspirators who will be served
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with summons as soon as their identities are divulged. The
complaint requests declaratory relief as to the contracts and
options between plaintiff and defendant, restitution of deposits paid to defendant, recovery of damages caused by
defendant'8 misrepresentations, and the recovery of secret
profits and rebates from defendant and his coconspirators.
In giving his deposition, defendant answered questions
concerning his negotiations with plaintiff's former president,
the execution of the integrated option, his delivery of goods
to plaintiff and plaintiff's subsequent refusal to pay him or
to accept further deliveries. He admitted making the buying
trip with plaintiff's former president and said that he had
offered to sell him engines that they had inspected together.
He refused, however, to reveal from whom, in what manner,
and at what prices he had acquired his engines. He was
asked about the nature of his business with Green Bros. Trucking Sales Company of Chicago, Illinois, whether he had purchased 650 to 750 engines from them, and whether he had
resold these engines to plaintiff, but he refused to answer.
Nor would he reveal the identities of any sellers of war
surplus machinery with whom he dealt during the buying
trip or the nature of his transactions with them, or answer
the questions: "Who in it [the surplus business] do you
know?" "What other companies besides GrE!'en Brothers did
you interview in Chicago 1" "Prior to this information that
someone else had bought stock in the I.E.S., you had a conversation with Tom Benevides about buying into the company
yourself, didn't you 1" "By the way, did your lawyer tell
you before this hearing, or prior to today, not to name the
yards or the people on your trip 7" He also refused to
answer questions concerning his knowledge of engines and
their prices. Asserting that the questions were irrelevant and
immaterial, that no foundation for them had been laid, that
communications by his counsel were privileged, and that he
was not required to reveal the sources of the goods that he
sold, defendant refused to answer fifty-five questions. Of
these, the superior court ordered him to answer only three.
[1] In the interest of full disclosure, the witness in a
deposition ~ken pursuant to section 2021, subdivision 1, of
the Code of Civil Procedure must answer all questions seeking nonprivileged information that is material to the subject
matter of the pending action (McOlatchy Newspapers v.
Superior Oourt, 26 Ca1.2d 386, 395 [159 P.2d 944]; San
Francisco Gas &- Eke. 00. v. Superior Oo-u.rt, 155 Cal. 30, 34
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[99 P. 359, 17 Ann.Cas. 933] ; Verdier v. Superior Court, 88
Cal.App.2d 527, 531 [199 P.~d 325] ; Rossbach v. Superior
Court, 43 Cal.App. 729, 731 [185 P. 879] ; see Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.2d 500, 505 [267 P.2d 1025, 268 P.2d 722] ;
Ahern v. Superior Court, 112 Cal.App.2d 27, 31 [245 P.2d
568] ; Carnation Co. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.2d 138,
140 [214 P.2d 552]), and he cannot block the interrogation
by contending that it is a "fishing expedition" or by urging
the secrecy of his methods of doing business.· [2] At the
same time, the taking of a deposition must not be abused
(Crocker v. Conrey, 140 Cal. 213, 217 [73 P. 1006», and the
witness need not answer questions that serve no proper purpose or are irrelevant. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2065. 2066;
McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Ca1.2d
386, 395; see Dastagir v. Dastagir, 109 Cal.App.2d 809, 816820 [241 P.2d 656], and cases and authorities there cited.)
[3] In the present case, most of the unanswered questions
seek to determine the identities of persons who sold goods
to defendant or from whom he intended to buy and defendant's knowledge of engines and their market values. Defendant's knowledge is relevant to the question whether his
repre~entations were made without belief, or in the absence
of reasonable grounds for belief, in their truth. (Civ. Code
§ 1710, subds. 1. 2.) Similarly, plaintiff was entitled to
learn the sources of the goods to determine whether they
were sold to defendant in the condition and at the prices
represented and whether the sellers had conspired with defendant to defraud plaintiff. Moreover, the identity of
persons from whom defendant intended to buy is relevant,
for if defendant's answers indicated that he had no anticipated source of supply, that fact would tend to prove that
he made promises to plaintiff without the intention of performing them. (Civ. Code, § 1710, subd. 4.) Forty-eight
of the questions involved seek information of the foregoing
kind and therefore must be answered. t
Four questions, however, are not within the seope of proper
interrogation. [4] On the ground that it was a privileged
*Methods of doing business, other than secret processes, developments,
or research, have not been protected from inquiry in deposition proceedings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Mos8 V. Aetna Stand·
ard Engineeri.ng Co., 11 Fed. Rules Serve 594; see 59 Yale L.J. 117, 42
Cal.L.Rev. 829.)
tAs numbered in Exhibit B of plaintiff's petition, the qlleationa that
aut be anawered a.re 1"" 7-10, 12-19, 21-48, and SO-s:i..
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communication, defendant refused to answer the question,
"By the way, did your lawyer tell you before this hearing,
or prior to today, not to name the yards or the people on
your trip?" Code of Civil Procedure, section 1881, subdivision 2, provides that "An attorney can not, without the
conSent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of professional employment." and it is settled that
the privilege cannot be defeated by attempting to elicit the
privileged communications from the client instead of the attorney. (City &7 County of San Francisco v. Superior Court,
37 Ca1.2d 227, 236 [231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418], and
cases cited.)
On the grounds that they were irrelevant and immaterial,
defendant refused to answer the following questions: "Prior
to this information that someone else had bought stock in
the I.E.S., you had a conversation with Tom Benavides about
buying into the company yourself, didn't you f" "What
other companies besides Green Brothers did you interview
in Chicago?" "Who in it [the surplus business] do you
know Y" [5] Whether or not defendant had a conversation
about buying stock in plaintiff has no bearing on the invalidity of the contracts, breaches of contract, misrepresentations, or conspiracies alleged in the complaint. The questions seeking the identities of everyone defendant knew
in the surplus business and everyone he interviewed in Chicago were too broad. It is not improbable that defendant
knew and interviewed people who had no connection with
his transactions with plaintiff, and the identity of such persons would be irrelevant. In this respect plaintiff may secure
all the information to which it is entitled by limiting its
inquiry to the identity of persons who were connected with
the transactions that are the subject matter of the action.
[6] Since an appeal from the final judgment would not
afford an adequate remedy for correcting the order of respondent court sustaining defendant's refusal to answer,
mandamus is the proper remedy. (McClatchy Newspapers v.
Superior Court, supra, 26 Ca1.2d 386, 392.) Let a writ of
mandate issue directing respondent to set aside its order
and to make the necessary orders to enable completion o.f
the deposition in accord with the views expressed herein.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., 8lld Spence, J., concurred.

